

109TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 3536

To ensure oversight of intelligence on Iran, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 19, 2006

Mr. REID (for himself, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. LEVIN, and Mr. DURBIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence

A BILL

To ensure oversight of intelligence on Iran, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Iran Intelligence Over-
5 sight Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. INTELLIGENCE ON IRAN.**

7 (a) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF UPDATED NA-
8 TIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN.—

9 (1) SUBMITTAL REQUIRED.—As soon as is
10 practicable, but not later than 90 days after the date

1 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Na-
2 tional Intelligence shall submit to Congress an up-
3 dated National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.

4 (2) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMITTAL.—If the
5 Director determines that the National Intelligence
6 Estimate required by paragraph (1) cannot be sub-
7 mitted by the date specified in that paragraph, the
8 Director shall submit to Congress a report setting
9 forth—

10 (A) the reasons why the National Intel-
11 ligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such
12 date; and

13 (B) an estimated date for the submittal of
14 the National Intelligence Estimate.

15 (3) FORM.—The National Intelligence Estimate
16 under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified
17 form. Consistent with the protection of intelligence
18 sources and methods, an unclassified summary of
19 the key judgments of the National Intelligence Esti-
20 mate should be submitted.

21 (4) ELEMENTS.—The National Intelligence Es-
22 timate submitted under paragraph (1) shall address
23 the following:

24 (A) The foreign policy and regime objec-
25 tives of Iran.

1 (B) The current status of the nuclear pro-
2 grams of Iran, including—

3 (i) an assessment of the current and
4 projected capabilities of Iran to design a
5 nuclear weapon, to produce plutonium, en-
6 riched uranium, and other weapons mate-
7 rials, to build a nuclear weapon, and to de-
8 ploy a nuclear weapon; and

9 (ii) an assessment of the intentions of
10 Iran regarding possible development of nu-
11 clear weapons, the motivations underlying
12 such intentions, and the factors that might
13 influence changes in such intentions.

14 (C) The military and defense capabilities
15 of Iran, including any non-nuclear weapons of
16 mass destruction programs and related delivery
17 systems.

18 (D) The relationship of Iran with terrorist
19 organizations, the use by Iran of terrorist orga-
20 nizations in furtherance of its foreign policy ob-
21 jectives, and the factors that might cause Iran
22 to reduce or end such relationships.

23 (E) The prospects for support from the
24 international community for various potential

1 courses of action with respect to Iran, including
2 diplomacy, sanctions, and military action.

3 (F) The anticipated reaction of Iran to the
4 courses of action set forth under subparagraph
5 (E), including an identification of the course or
6 courses of action most likely to successfully in-
7 fluence Iran in terminating or moderating its
8 policies of concern.

9 (G) The level of popular and elite support
10 within Iran for the Iran regime, and for its civil
11 nuclear program, nuclear weapons ambitions,
12 and other policies, and the prospects for reform
13 and political change within Iran.

14 (H) The views among the populace and
15 elites of Iran with respect to the United States,
16 including views on direct discussions with or
17 normalization of relations with the United
18 States.

19 (I) The views among the populace and
20 elites of Iran with respect to other key countries
21 involved in nuclear diplomacy with Iran.

22 (J) The likely effects and consequences of
23 any military action against the nuclear pro-
24 grams or other regime interests of Iran.

1 (K) The confidence level of key judgments
2 in the National Intelligence Estimate, the qual-
3 ity of the sources of intelligence on Iran, the
4 nature and scope of any gaps in intelligence on
5 Iran, and any significant alternative views on
6 the matters contained in the National Intel-
7 ligence Estimate.

8 (b) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON POLICY OBJECTIVES
9 AND UNITED STATES STRATEGY REGARDING IRAN.—

10 (1) REPORT REQUIRED.—As soon as is prac-
11 ticable, but not later than 90 days after the date of
12 the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
13 mit to Congress a report on the following:

14 (A) The objectives of United States policy
15 on Iran.

16 (B) The strategy for achieving such objec-
17 tives.

18 (2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1)
19 shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classi-
20 fied annex, as appropriate.

21 (3) ELEMENTS.—The report submitted under
22 paragraph (1) shall—

23 (A) address the role of diplomacy, incen-
24 tives, sanctions, other punitive measures and in-
25 centives, and other programs and activities re-

1 lating to Iran for which funds are provided by
2 Congress; and

3 (B) summarize United States contingency
4 planning regarding the range of possible United
5 States military actions in support of United
6 States policy objectives with respect to Iran.

7 (c) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
8 ON PROCESS FOR VETTING AND CLEARING ADMINISTRA-
9 TION OFFICIALS' STATEMENTS DRAWN FROM INTEL-
10 LIGENCE.—

11 (1) REPORT REQUIRED.—As soon as is prac-
12 ticable, but not later than 90 days after the date of
13 the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
14 Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the
15 process for vetting and clearing statements of Ad-
16 ministration officials that are drawn from or rely
17 upon intelligence.

18 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report shall—

19 (A) describe current policies and practices
20 of the Office of the Director of National Intel-
21 ligence and the intelligence community for—

22 (i) vetting and clearing statements of
23 senior Administration officials that are
24 drawn from or rely upon intelligence; and

- 1 (ii) how significant misstatements of
2 intelligence that may occur in public state-
3 ments of senior public officials are identi-
4 fied, brought to the attention of any such
5 officials, and corrected;
- 6 (B) assess the sufficiency and adequacy of
7 such policies and practices; and
- 8 (C) include any recommendations that the
9 Director considers appropriate to improve such
10 policies and practices.

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